[RFC] Vesta V2 - Hearth Upgrade


We are introducing the Hearth Upgrade, featuring a brand new staking infrastructure, a new interest rate framework, a new website, and other features, transforming VST into a self-sustainable, public good stablecoin. The interest rate charged on the stablecoin would go fully to a newly established VST-USDC stablecoin pool on Curve, funding VST liquidity, facilitating one of the most liquid crypto-only-backed stablecoins. This updates allows Vesta to get one step closer to its mission: maximizing the potential of all crypto assets.


Through operating Vesta Stable - VST for more than a year, we found that over-collateralized stablecoin in DeFi is one of the best tools for leveraging. In 2022 alone, Vesta saw more than $1b of trading volume on our stablecoin, helping people levering on assets like ETH, wstETH, and GLP.

Vesta is on the cusp of becoming infinitely scalable and fully self-sustainable. The only thing standing in our way is a lack of proper liquidity provisioning infrastructure.

Currently, VST’s liquidity is VST-FRAX on Curve, with the liquidity being compensated by one of our angel investor’s veFXS votes. While it makes sense to rely on as many good liquidity deals for as long as possible, such a deal would not last forever. To become fully self-sustainable, the stablecoin needs a mechanism to be self-sufficient when it comes to liquidity.

To tackle this problem, we are rolling out Hearth Upgrade, featuring a brand new staking infrastructure, a new interest rate framework, a new website, and other features, transforming VST into a self-sustainable, public good stablecoin. The interest rate charged on the stablecoin would go fully to a newly established VST-USDC stablecoin pool on Curve, funding VST liquidity, facilitating one of the most liquid crypto-only-backed stablecoins. This updates allows Vesta to get one step closer to its mission: maximizing the potential of all crypto assets.


New Liquidity Provisioning Infrastructure - VSTA Staking Module and VST LP Module

Current VST liquidity is funded externally via Tetranode’s FXS shares. To enable liquidity to scale with vault growth, we plan to send interest revenue to fund VST liquidity. Furthermore, the governance token, VSTA, will be required for liquidity providers to enjoy these yields, boosting the utility of the governance token. In short, the interest rate will be passed onto liquidity provider of a newly established VST-USDC pool on Curve, but in order to receive it, a user will have to boost his position using VSTA. This solution not only creates a path for liquidity to scale along with vault growth, but also involve the governance token into the protocol.

Our hope is by funnelling revenue to incentivize VST liquidity, VST will become the most liquid crypto-backed stablecoin on Arbitrum, rivaling the likes of DAI and FRAX. Deeper liquidity would attract more users to VST as it is one of the only crypto-backed stablecoins on the market, increasing VST’s monetary premium as more people hold it in wallets and use it for transactions. It would also further facilitate a smooth trading experience for the VST minters, as they would be able to easily buy and sell large positions of VST at ease.

The program is two fold: VSTA Staking Module and VST LP Module. Below is a short summary of the modules. Details will be released when the protocol is close to being live.

VSTA Staking Module

VSTA Staking Module is set up to incentivize certain behaviours within the protocol. It will direct token inflation to those acting favourably towards the protocol without overwhelming circulating token supply by making the token vest over a period of time.

Users may stake VSTA-ETH 80-20 LP token to earn bVSTA (boost VSTA), which will be the reward token. bVSTA is non-transferrable, may be used toward benefits such as boosting the reward in VST LP Module, and may be vested into liquid VSTA in 12 months.

VST LP Module

VST LP Module aims to reward people for providing liquidity to VST-paired liquidity pools. The protocol’s interest revenue is rewarded to users via this module to facilitate deep VST liquidity. User may boost a pool with bVSTA so the user could earn reward in the form of VSTA.

Boosting is the act of allocating bVSTA toward a pool to enable/earn more reward in VSTA. A user’s bVSTA could be allocated toward a particular VST-paired liquidity pool, influencing his or her VSTA reward APR. Subsequently, the APR for a user is determined by his own bVSTA pointed toward this pool, how much bVSTA in total is pointed toward this pool, and the staked amount.

New Interest Rate Framework

The current interest rate framework on Vesta was decided mainly to fight off significant VST de-pegs. However, the base level of the interest rates (when VST isn’t suffering from de-peg) was arbitrarily decided.

In order to support VST liquidity without relying on external sources, we’ll need to revamp the interest rates to a level so that the liquidity of the stablecoin can be sustained, and then relay the fees fully to liquidity provisioning. We propose a new interest rate framework that would allow the interest revenue to fully cover the cost of liquidity provisioning.

interest is now collateral-specific and has four parameters

  • max_rate = max amount of rate charged when the stablecoin is depegged downward
  • max_down_depeg_in_pct = how much downward depeg the stablecoin has to be for max_rate to be reached (in percentage term)
  • max_up_depeg_in_pct = how much upward depeg the stablecoin has to be for the rate to be 0%
  • base_rate = interest rate when the stablecoin is on-peg

Similar to the current reference rate scheme, the interest rate would react accordingly in the event of a depeg. For a graphical example, please view the chart below. The x-axis represents the depeg amount in %, and the y-axis represents the total interest rate.

Universal Rates

  • max_rate: 200%
    • 200% interest rate when the stablecoin is too de-pegged encourages very effective supply shrink. In March 2023 during USDC depeg, VST price went down as well, causing interest rate to increase significantly. Subsequently, supply of VST shrunk and forced the token back to peg successfully.
  • max_down_depeg_in_pct: 5%
    • To encourage depeg to not exceed a certain level, we set this parameter at 5% so that it reaches 200% when the token is below peg by 5% at $0.95.
  • max_up_depeg_in_pct: 0.5%
    • When the stablecoin is overpeg, the system decreases interest rate to 0% to encourage borrowing. Setting this parameter to 0.5% means that when the price is over-peg by 0.5% at 1.005, the interest rate goes to 0%.

Collateral Specific Rate - base_rate

Base rate is the rate charged when the stablecoin is on-peg. It is determined by

  1. Looking at competitors’ rates
  2. Applying a discount

Calculating Competitors’ Rates

Competitors include other CDP protocols. Calculating rates from CDP protocol entail taking the average of interest rate weighted by the amount of collateral in the protocol. For assets that are not listed on other CDP protocols, we will refer to lending protocols. If the lending protocols do not have comparable markets (such as the market doesn’t have similar amount of lending capacity), then the interest rates would be solely determined by past price volatility.

Estimating Average Interest Rate on Lending Protocols

We aim to align the rates to be in line with the market average. Everyday, a snapshot is taken of all the lending protocols.

If the total capacity of the market isn’t greater than the amount currently lent out on Vesta (for example, a lending market for XYZ has only 600k USDC supplied into it, but there’s currently 1m of VST generated from XYZ on Vesta) then this market is counted as non-qualified and will not be considered.

For each lending protocol, calculate the stablecoin borrowing cost. Then take the weighted average of all lending protocol by each market’s rate weighted by total borrowed amount.

How to calculate the stablecoin borrowing cost:

  1. We first take the mean of the stablecoins’ borrowing cost. (Qualified stablecoins: USDC, USDT, DAI, FRAX)
  2. Minus the deposit rate of the collateral itself

How to calculate the total borrowed amount if it is not known:

  • extrapolate it by calculating the collateral’s total deposited amount * the collateral’s LTV * (1 - safety margin). Safety margin is the amount of collateral could be a parameter like 30%.

Calculating Discount

We aim to embed a discount to the average rates to remain competitive and attract liquidity. A starting discount of 10% is applied. GLP has a slightly different rate applied as the closest comparable Abracadabra has a different cost structure: Abracadabra takes a lower management fee while charging a higher interest rate. As a result, a 50% discount is applied to GLP.

For a demo of base_rate calculation, please see this file. The calculation shows that assuming an APR of 7%, the current mint volume should sustain at least $3.3m in total liquidity depth.

Interest Rate Implementation

The reference rate part of the interest rate will continue to utilize the current infrastructure. You may learn more about our VST oracle here. We aim to update the base_rate automatically by querying for the relevant information and updating the base_rate every hour or so. The exact frequency is yet to be determined.

Merging Saving Module and Stability Pools into a Main Stability Pool to Focus on Liquidity Provisioning

Liquidation bonus is the primary reason why people deposit into the stability pool. In our saving module, although depositors are second in line to liquidate relative to the individual stability pools, they are still enjoying the 10% liquidation bonus when liquidation occurs, on top of the interest fee coming from the vaults. The liquidating bonus served a valuable purpose during the USDC crash by helping to liquidate positions and prevent a depeg. However, there are rooms to optimize and also give depositors in the Saving Module an interest fee, as the liquidating bonus is already quite profitable. This could free up resources that could be used to improve other aspects of the protocol.

We are not fully utilizing the potential of the assets in the saving module as 99% of the value locked cannot be used for liquidation or marketing making, etc. Thus, with the merging of all individual stability pool and the saving module, we can ensure the liquidation of all assets and also have the fees be directed to incentivize a deep liquidity pool for the stablecoin.

Updating Voting Token for Governance

Given the new staking program, the governance token eligible for voting will change to

  • Nominal VSTA amount in staked VSTA-ETH
  • staked bVSTA


The discussion period for this RFC will be live for one week and will be extended if there’s any significant un-addressed opinions. After that, this RFC would move into the voting on Snapshot, which will be live for 3 days.

Upon passing of this proposal, we aim to implement all described changes within 1-2 months. No migration will be needed for current vault openers. The new staking module (and the correlating VSTA-ETH 80-20 pool, the VST-USDC pool) will all be established independently, along with a new website.


No objection regarding a VSTA-ETH 80-20, this seems to work for several other protocols.

Regarding the VST-USDC pool… wouldn’t it be better to pair VST with a Frax basepool ?
I think I’ve heard Frax helps incentivize pools which pair with the BP, which could help maintain sufficient liquidity & peg for VST while lowering the amount needed to incentivize it.

Finally… the upgrade would increase a lot the rate of borrowing, aren’t you afraid this will drive the users away ? Since we went from the one time fee to a higher borrowing rate (which would be further increased), why even stay on vesta and take the SC risk + higher rate instead of going somewhere else (aave come to my mind for ETH/WSTETH but anywhere really).

Shouldn’t we increase the usages of VST (since it can only be stacked in SP or dumped for USDC to get a real usage) ?

This sounds great and I’m definitely in favor of the upgrade.

I would just caution against raising rates too high since there aren’t specific numbers here. VST is still lacking in utility vs. most other stablecoins and the borrow rate is essentially the price vault owners pay to use VST; products that aren’t as in-demand can’t command a high price versus more widely-used products.

Hi everyone,

Great proposal, and in the right direction I would say, but perhaps overcomplicates things a bit.

The key take-home messages I got are:

a) VST is used mainly for leverage, leading to frequent de-pegs of VST

b) A solution would be to incentivise LP-ing (bring farmers), and using the interest revenue to do so is a neat idea. My thought here is that we might want to think more carefully where we deploy the pool. The curve ecosystem would seem as the best option, if we had the right tools (CRV etc). But I guess we don’t, so why don’t we consider other options as well?

The new Interest Rate Framework is way too complicated for my taste (especially the base rate and discount calculation). Also, I believe it does not fit with the public-good vision of the protocol, as it is assumes the protocol will be reacting to external sources (competition). (I envision a public goods protocol as a stand-alone one).

Here are a few ideas/commment that are in-line with the current proposal but aim to make the protocol more user friendly (apologies if they are too naive or difficult to implement).

  1. Pay people for LP-ing their minted VST in the form of a deduction in their interest rates (which could now become negative; self-repaying loan). Of course you could also have the rest of the sauce on top with boosting (in the form of VSTA derivatives, pool emissions etc ) for staking the VSTA etc. This will make it simpler and more attractive for yield farmers, as they won’t have to calculate how much they are paying in interest rate and how much they are earning from LP-ing.
  2. I have a feeling that stability pools will suffer. People could be over incentivised to LP rather than stake in stability pools, so perhaps some revenue should be directed there.
  3. Users will pay an interest rate than depends on de-peg %, the asset they are borrowing against, and the yield of this asset (if it’s a yield bearing asset). If there is enough liquidity why there is a need to have a base rate? Again I suspect there is some reason but it needs to be communicated better. If they stake VSTA perhaps offer them a discount.
  4. in the UI, offer a simple way to directly borrow into an LP position and convert collateral into an LP position.

Hey @OxGZK thanks for your reply. The establishment of VST-USDC pool aims to give VST a main place to trade that allows for deep liquidity without extra involvement from anyone, and so a USDC pool is one that fits the profile the most. USDC is widely acknowledged to be one of the most dependable fiat-backed stablecoin given its transparency. Pairing VST with FRAX would further our dependency with FRAX which is not a good idea since FRAX has lots of moving parts. Say that their base pool infra upgrades, then we will have to upgrade our pool as well. FRAX also isn’t as widely adopted as USDC.

While the rate increase may drive away some TVL, ultimately the rates are going to be market competitive (the method of how the new interest rates are determined). Fully relaying the fees to the liquidity pool would also facilitate an equilibrium in terms of borrowing demand and LP depth. LP would scale up and down with the leverage demand. The reference rate part of the interest rate would keep VST on peg. It’s a system that would facilitate equilibrium.

As for SC risk, we’ll conduct and publish more audits to further increase the security of the smart contracts.

In terms of usage of VST, ironically our asks of integrating VST across different platform have all been met with the same reason of rejection - lack of liquidity. Therefore, by creating this self-sustaining model that scales liquidity with leverage demand, we’ll be able to integrate VST into more places as well.


Hey @Maswasnos thanks for your reply. Please take a look at this excel sheet for base_rate calculation:

In the excel sheet you’ll see that there’s a “Vesta discount” column, which means that we’ll apply a discount to the calculated market average to ensure that our rates are competitive.

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Hey @mv_kr thanks for your reply. This proposal was intended to address every aspect of how to make the stablecoin fully self-sustainable so it may seem a bit complicated a bit.

The framework was published for the sake of bring light to our rate calculation methodology. This process is also done at similar protocols like Maker but with even less transparency. Unfortunately, taking a very straightforward, non-complex approach would not aid Vesta in terms of being the most effective. For example, our current rates were determined fairly arbitrarily and utilizes a very simple methodology but as we can see it is not working out that well.

While your understanding of reacting to competition does not fit with the public-good image may be a correct one, our definition of public good means that the protocol’s revenue stays within the protocol. We aim to direct the interest revenue to buy VSTA then distribute those tokens as reward to the VST-USDC pool, facilitating a close loop that ensures liquidity for the stablecoin.

I’ll also address each of your points:
1 and 4. Paying people for LP-ing their minted VST is exactly what the proposal enables. While vault openers pay on their vault positions, they can also then directly deposit those VST loans into the LP to earn back the interest that they’ve paid. We are creating the best user experience to facilitate this.
2. The stability pool in its current form achieves very high yield for depositors. A extensive ROI analysis is beyond the scope of my reply but if you look at the individual stability pools (which do not get any incentives) right now, there are currently 270k VST across all the pools.
3. Unfortunately there isn’t enough liquidity at the moment. The reason for adding base_rate is simply to increase liquidity of the stablecoin when the token is on-peg, which we hope is the state most of the time.


Hi @mikey, thanks for your reply. I agree that a public good is foremost transparent, so putting the methodology (no matter how complex) out there is the right path forward. One more thing: What about adding somehow the yield that the collateral asset produces to the calculation of the interest rate? Do you have data suggesting that borrowing on high-yield assets contributes more to de-pegs, or that when the yield of an asset goes up de-peg is more likely?

Hi @mv_kr you’ve made a good suggestion here. I’ve yet to add in the asset’s inherent yield into the calculation but it’s true that they play an important part in the “effective” rate. It’s very evident that borrowing on high-yield assets contribute to more depeg. VST had such a case with GLP last summer as GLP minted VST increased to 6m and VST depegged to 0.97. This is also evident in Abracadabra’s total history. It is always used heavily for leveraging and it is chronically underpeg.

The two yielding tokens in our current collateral list is GMX and GLP. I’ll use a similar competition-driven method to determine the interest rate since that’s how we’ll remain competitive, and we’ll utilize mint cap to ensure that it does not wreck havoc on VST’s peg.

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Hi Mikey, great proposal - my only concern is the implication on the smart contract side. What measure will be taken to ensure the safety of asset given such large changes?


overall, this seems quite promising!

  1. I think that it is a good idea to diversify the availability of VST pools and believe that having one with USDC is good.

Can you please elaborate on the following: "While it makes sense to rely on as many good liquidity deals for as long as possible, such a deal would not last forever. "?

Are you thinking about not renewing the deal after the 500 days have passed? If yes, what are the consequences? A new pool somewhere else or only the one on curve?

  1. This point is linked to my first one, but I feel like it would still benefit Vesta to have a Liquidity Pool with a volatile asset to increase volume, arbitrages, and diversification. I know this has been discussed previously, but I think that it would be quite helpful to have at least one LP on a DEX on Arbitrum. I am not going to mention any potential DEX here, as I don’t really have a preference, but surely a few would be willing to build a new partnership with Vesta!

Furthermore, and this is just an assumption, but I believe that a volatile LP could potentially increase VST buy pressure from people who want to LP in a VST-volatile pool! For example, VST-ETH could attract new users, who could buy their VST through the VST-USDC curve directly! Generally, if APRs are good enough, these pools tend to attract a LOT of users who will just market buy VST to LP. Furthermore, such a pool, in my opinion, tends to reduce sell pressure from minters, as someone who has a lot of ETH can deposit, say, 60% of his ETH stack on Vesta, borrow VST, and pair his remaining ETH with the borrowed VST! No sell pressure here, as opposed to GLP loopers!

If the protocol relies ONLY on minters to provide VST on the market, where does the buy pressure come from? For example, loopers will: Deposit GLP => Mint VST => Sell VST => Buy more GLP => Mint VST => Sell VST => Repeat. There is only sell pressure. How can the peg effectively be maintained if there is zero buy pressure?

From my assumption, when people want to loop, at one point, the pool will be unbalanced and they will have to unloop, thus reducing VST’s supply & interest payments! Basically it limits VST’s growth potential!

What are your thoughts on this, and are there any plans to increase options for VST minters and potential buyers? I remember that we discussed a VST-ARB pool previously, which could also be an interesting option. And furthermore, apologies for bringing this up again, but I really believe that using a few ARB tokens that the protocol received to incentivize such a pool could really increase VST’s adoption!

I think that overall, the curve pool won’t attract much outside liquidity, unless interest payments are very attractive, and I’m not entirely sure it will be the case!

  1. I think that it’s pretty cool to direct interests to the new Curve pool, but after checking the calculations for the interest rates from the docs, they seem rather high (while at peg)!

I agree that it shouldn’t be free, but for example, a 3.11% interest rate on wsteth feels quite high when you compare it to the wsteth returns, which are around 4-5%? Wouldn’t that push people away from minting VST?

Same goes for GLP, despite the volatile nature of its returns, I think that we can argue that it’s generally around 15-20% percent. A 6.3% interest rate would represent over 30% of the returns.

I know people are also using VST to loop it into more GLP, but I think that there is a debate between:

  • Higher interest rates => Less attractive to mint VST => Decent Curve yield but small pool? => VST is less “stable”
  • Lower interest rates => More attractive to mint VST => Lower Curve yield but bigger pool? => VST is more "stable

Again, these are just assumptions on my side, nothing tangible behind!

Also, when I look into the detailed calculations, many of these Money Markets also pay extra incentives with their tokens, which I believe completely skew the borrowing rates, as people are looping as much as possible!

Bottom line, would an arbitrary fixed interest rate not be better (while at peg)? This would give VST minters much more long term clarity! Or, for example, for productive assets, such as wsteth and glp, why not take a performance fee?

As an example, I am a Mai user and I know very well how much I am paying to borrow, and I do not have to constantly worry about it! If interest rates at peg are fair and not volatile, it also attracts much stickier liquidity imo!

  1. Increasing VSTA’s utility with the lock mechanism is great as well. As a disclaimer, I hold VSTA, but I think that it’s important to balance the bonuses or the discounts well vs. non holders/lockers, to also make the protocol attractive to non VSTA holders.

I personally dislike it when I feel forced to buy the protocol token to make a specific farming strategy profitable.

Overall, it’s quite promising but I think that it’s really important to balance the interest rates when VST is pegged and also whether or not it is still attractive to mint VST for people who do not wish to buy/lock VSTA! Furthermore, and I am wondering whether it is me who is being stubborn or not, but I think that Vesta really should start to use the ARB airdrop to drive much more liquidity on a dex with a volatile LP. Currently, there doesn’t seem to be much “outside” interest in VST, because it lacks both visibility and utility!

Hi @wnchen great to hear from you. The changes to the current smart contract are not large. Some new features will be added modularly. We are looking to engage an audit for the whole codebase with the upgrades as soon as we can.

Hi @Complete_Degen good to see you again!

We’d love to continue that deal but there’s really no guarantee whether Tetra would like to continue that as it’s not the most favorable deal for him. Regardless of what happens to that pool, we would like to focus on ensuring that the protocol is fully self-sustainable on a base level.

We are defining two types of liquidity pool in the VST LP Module: core pools and guest pools. This VST-USDC pool is what we call a core pool, and other pools that we’ll set up will be called guest pools. Core pools will receive the bought back VSTA from interest revenue. So on a base level, there’s always a way for relay interest revenue to attract more liquidity, ensuring liquidity to scale with vault growth. Other liquidity deals shall exist but they are more like sweeteners on top, such as the Tetra deal and other LP pools.

People generally accept lower yield return when the pool consists of only stablecoins. If we establish a VST-ETH as core pool right off the bat we’ll not be able to attract as much liquidity as a VST-USDC pool since people will deposit less into a volatile pool given the same APR. This is not to say that we’ll forever stick to a single VST-USDC pool. It’s possible that we’ll establish other core pools down the road.

There’s a balancing act between liquidity providers, loopers and users of the stablecoin. Our plan is:

  1. Ensure there’s a path between interest rate and liquidity provisioning so there’s a way to grow liquidity when there’s heavy leverage demand.
  2. List collaterals that people want to leverage and that people are willing to pay for and so we can increase stablecoin supply along with the liquidity pool.
  3. While supply grows and liquidity pool deepens, increase places where VST is integrated to increase VST’s use cases. Like I mentioned in a previous reply, VST has had a hard time with integration due to lack of liquidity so step 1 and 2 are necessary before this step. The increasing amount of use cases allow VST to be used in more places, increasing the likeliness of people/protocols holding more VST, which further helps to balance the liquidity pool.

One thing I believe that I think diverges from your perspective is that setting up new liquidity pool with different assets does not increase the demand of the stablecoin (this is also why I’ve been reluctant to set up new liquidity pools in general). What matters is the total amount of liquidity in total. Most of Vesta’s users are savvy enough to use dex aggregator so the imbalance between liquidity pools are generally arbitraged. In fact, multiple liquidity pool decreases efficiency as there’s now arbitrage, which leaks value to arbitragors compared to a single liquidity pool.

However, there’s definitely value if the new pool being set up benefits from partnership. For example, if the new pool receive extra incentives from our partner. If the numbers are quite enticing then I won’t say no to free incentives!

With regards to using ARB to incentivize, that require a whole new conversation. There’s lots to consider, for example is it as effective as using it during the bull market, is it as effective as using it for our later product, etc. Overall this require a new proposal.

The number may seem high but if the whole market is charging those rates then it’s only reasonable to stay competitive. This is generally how lending rates works - if you see a local bank charging 1% but the fed raised rates to 5%, then this bank is definitely going to run out of deposits to lend out. Transforming this into a DeFi project - Vesta charging lower than market rate for our loans, subsequently we cannot sustain the same level of liquidity as those who charge market rates - if we charge lower, then it’s actually to our detriment since the liquidity pool depth will be lower. It’s basically what’s happening to Vesta right now.

I want to reply to this via a response I wrote earlier:

This is a good point. If anything, we are also planning to give out some extra incentives! I have yet to run the numbers but it should be competitive to the other protocols on this front as well.

Without a fully automatic reactive interest rate model, the token would likely depeg. You can see this in early days DAI, current LUSD and MAI. This is now entering the topic of peg stability mechanisms. If we stick to using interest rate to ensure peg, then an alternative solution would be setting up a policy team to monitor this 24/7. I don’t think that’s a better solution since we want to minimize manual work with the protocol. We can also go beyond only using interest rate to ensure the peg like adding redemption like LUSD, adding USDC as collateral like DAI, using external capital to buy the stablecoin when it goes off-peg like crvUSD (which is why I think crvUSD interest is so high right now). But we’ll stick to using interest rate for now.

This is definitely a good topic to discuss. We are starting with giving 0 to non-VSTA-stakers and 100% to VSTA-stakers and potentially changing it if it doesn’t work out well. The reason for 0 going to non-VSTA-stakers is that there’s Radiant which has implemented this and it has worked well for them. I understand this is also heavily dependent on user experience (making a flow which makes it easy for them to acquire become a locker in one click) so I’m working on that as well.

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